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Abstract—In cloud investment markets, consumers are looking
for the lowest cost and a desirable fairness while providers
are looking for strategies to achieve the highest possible profit
and return. Most existing models for auction-based resource
allocation in cloud environments only consider the overall profit
increase and ignore the profit of each participant individually
or the difference between the rich and the poor participants.
This paper proposes a multi-dimensional fairness combinato-
rial double auction (MDFCDA) model which strikes a balance
between the revenue and the fairness among participants. We
solve a winner determination problem (WDP) through integer
programming which incorporates the fairness attribute based
on the history of participants which is stored in a repository.
Our evaluation results show that the proposed model increases
the willingness of participants to take part in the next auction
rounds. Moreover the average percentage of resource utilization
is increased.
Index Terms—Resource allocation, Cloud Computing, Auction,
Fairness
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is an emerging technology in distributed
environments where hardware and software computing re-
sources are virtualized and delivered in the form of services
to clients. Cloud computing provides a dynamic computing
infrastructure, optimal resources allocation, rapid elastic ac-
cess to computing architectures, reusable resources, flexibility,
on-demand services, pay-per-use model, lower costs, and etc.
[5], [8], [12]. Therefore, due to many advantages of cloud
computing, numerous users have been attracted to the use of
cloud-based resources and services. The increasing number
of users have made the management and allocation of cloud-
based resources a challenging task. Resource allocation plays
an important role in efficiency of the overall system and
the level of consumer satisfaction of the deployed system.
Therefore, it must be in such a way that in addition to
delivering profit to the providers, consumer satisfaction will
also be considered [2]. Different approaches and models try to
solve the resource allocation problem efficiently. Economics-
based approaches such as market-based and auction-based
resource allocation mechanisms have been two recent popular
techniques to solve the aforementioned problem. In market-
based approach, providers determine the resources price based
on the number of resources that consumers are asking. While
in the auction-based approach both providers and consumers
have an impact on the agreed final prices [3].
Auction is an efficient economic system based on bidding
where buyer/vendor compete with each other to purchase/sell
commodities [7], [12]. In an auction the vendors goal is to
gain the most profit in the long run while the buyers expect
their tasks to be run at the lowest cost with respect to the
expected level of service. The auction system in the cloud
environment is comprised of three major components, namely,
the cloud provider (CP), the cloud consumer (CC) and the
cloud auctioneer (CA). In Fig. 1 the responsibility and the
relationship between these three components is briefly speci-
fied. The auctioneer is responsible for allocating resources and
determining the final price that is payable for each participant.
The bidder drop issue is one of the important concerns in
auctions that should be dealt with. This problem occurs when
participants with powerful and high quality bids have a better
chance of winning the auction. As a result, weaker participants
will be gradually pushed aside and the strong ones dominate
the auction [7]. Hence, adding a fairness term to the problem
formulation when choosing the winners can help alleviate this
issue by enforcing the equality conditions among participants.
Even though the impact of such a policy may not be tangible in
the short run, it tends to increase the willingness of participants
to take part in the auctions in the long run [1].
Auctions in general can be placed in one of the major
categories of one-sided or double-sided. In a one-sided auc-
tion, multiple buyers compete to purchase commodities of
from vendor or multiple vendors compete with each other
to sell their commodities to a single buyer. In contrast, in a
double-sided auction, multiple buyers compete with multiple
vendors to purchase the commodities. A double-sided auction
has been shown to be more efficient than holding multiple one-
sided auctions [11]. Moreover, an auction system can be either
single-item or combinatorial. In a single item auction each bid
is attributed to only one resource whereas in the combinatorial
one, participants can request combinations of resources in their
bids to run their tasks on. This type of auction is more efficient
than old style single item auction [11], [13].
In the rest of the paper, first a brief survey of the related
works in multi-attribute auction domain is given focusing
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Fig. 1: A schematic view of an auction components and their
interactions. In step 1 each consumer and provider send their
bid to the auctioneer. After determination of the winners, in
step 2 the auctioneer takes the resources from providers and
gives them to the related consumers. In step 3 the transaction
prices are specified and the consumers pay the payment to the
providers.
on approaches that integrate the fairness attribute into their
model. In section 2 we introduce our proposed model in
a combinatorial double auction which includes a fairness
factor. In section 3 we evaluate our model and compare its
performance with a similar auction model that disregards the
individual fairness. Finally, in section 4 we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
There has been many studies that have tried to maximize the
overall profits in some formulated auction resource allocation
problem in a cloud environment as their main objective. Even
though in some of these works, in addition to the price,
factors such as delivery time, quality of service and even
penalty policies are taken into account, but few of them have
considered the fairness attribute.
In [1] a fair multi-attribute combinatorial double auction
model is introduced in order to increase the consumer satis-
faction. Fairness and providers’ reputation, are two attributes
that are used by the authors of the article. In this model
due to the policies that are considered, providers who give
incorrect information will be punished and their reputation will
be decreased in the next round of auction. Hence, this model
seeks increasing user satisfaction and truthfulness of providers.
In [7] a multi-dimensional fairness mechanism is employed
in an auction-based environment. In order to overcome the
bidder drop problem, the author introduced three approaches
of calculating of the fairness, namely, the quantitative, the
qualitative, and the stochastic approaches. In their work a
consumer which is in a miserable situation and as a result
may leave the auction, is given a higher priority to reduce the
possibility of him leaving the auction.
On the other hand, the limited available resources as well
as the high demand from users result in loss of fairness in
the allocation of network resources. To address this issue,
Wu et al. [10] proposed an efficient relay resource allocation
that considered fairness competition between users. Their
method tried to add fairness by using the incomplete private
information obtained from other nodes. In another study
[9], authors designed an auction mechanism to allocate the
spectrum resources with a trade-off between maximization of
revenue and fairness. In their algorithm, bidders ranks will be
changed based on the critical condition in order to decrease
starvation. Finally, Lee et al. [4] used a service oriented auction
mechanism to deal with the bidder drop problem. In their
proposed work, each resource has a reservation price and will
be sold to the customer who has suggested a higher price.
The resources that remain in the end will be shared among
the weakest customers.
III. AUCTION MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first describe our model and its fairness
mechanism. Then the winner determination problem is formu-
lated as an integer programming (IP) problem.
A. Multi-Dimensional Fairness Combinatorial Double Auc-
tion Model (MDFCDA)
In this article we propose a new combinatorial double
auction in cloud environment that considers multi-dimensional
fairness, henceforth, a multi-dimensional fairness combinato-
rial double auction model (MDFCDA). In our model we used
multi-dimensional fairness inspired by work report in [6] and
formulate it in the form of an integer programming framework
to solve the WDP and resource allocation problem.
In the proposed model, multiple providers, consumers and
different resources (in terms of capacity and the number of
CPU, memory size and bandwidth) are considered. Auction
takes place in several rounds; in each round the providers and
consumers individually deliver their bids to the auctioneer in
order to sell and buy the resources. The providers offer the
available resources in their bids and the consumers request for
the bundle of resources in their bids to run their applications
(tasks). The main task of the auctioneer after receiving and
collecting the bids from different participants is first, to extend
them and then to select the winners and allocate resources to
them and determine the transaction price.
There is a repository for storing historical information
of participants. In this repository, information such as the
number of wins, the number of losses, the overall quality of
the participant bids and other factors related to the previous
auction round is stored. Hence, the auctioneer extends the
bids and makes decision on determining the winners based
on the information available in this repository. Moreover, by
our assumption, if a resource is assigned to a consumer it
will not be released until the end of the auction round and
the execution time of the user tasks on the assigned resources
ends by then.
The fairness attribute helps reducing the number of bidders
that drop and as a result the number of participants who could
not compete with more powerful participants and leave the
auction will be reduced. A. Pla [7], has introduced a quan-
titative, a qualitative and a stochastic approach for enforcing
the fairness. In a quantitative approach, fairness is calculated
based on the number of victories and failures of participants
in the previous rounds of auction. This approach encourages
the weak participants to participate in the upcoming auction
rounds by increasing the chances of their winning. But the
main issue with this approach is that each participant can
easily increases his chance of winning with a dummy bid.
A dummy bid is a bid which has the lowest possible price
for the resources to increase the odds of winning the next
rounds after losing several rounds. To solve this problem and
also to affect the bids attributes to increase or decrease the
chance of winning, the qualitative approach is proposed. In
contrast, in a quantitative approach the chance of winning
for each participant depends on the bid attributes (e.g. the
suggested price, QoS, etc). Finally, in a stochastic approach,
measurements that are performed based on the previous two
approaches are randomly applied.
In our proposed approach, fairness attribute is guaranteed
by a fairness factor that takes on a real value. The higher the
value, the more the chance of winning will be. This defined
fairness factor fuses all the previously mentioned perspectives
(i.e. qualitative, quantitative and stochastic approaches) into
one single measure. In cases where two participants have
similar conditions in terms of the number of wins and losses,
the qualitative approach favors the one with a higher bid value.
Therefor the fairness factor is calculated by the qualitative and
quantitative approaches and then it is tuned according to the
stochastic approach.
The following policies are considered in computing the
fairness factor:
• On the one hand, the participants who have more losses
are given more chance of winning and on the other hand,
participants who have more wins are given less chance
of winning.
• Among the losers of previous auction round, the partici-
pant who has the bid with higher quality (such as having
higher bid price, lesser service time, etc.) are given more
chance of winning. Also among the winners of previous
auction round, the participant who has the bid with lower
quality are given less chance of winning.
• The more the participant be in on the verge of a drop
(i.e. has lost a higher number of consecutive rounds) the
higher the value that the fairness factor will take on.
Algorithm 1 shows the procedure to calculate the fairness
factor for consumers. In this algorithm CLn is the last number
of consecutive losses for the consumer n (assuming that after
each victory, CLn takes on value 0). ml is the maximum
consecutive auction rounds that consumers can loose and if
CLn > ml the bidder drop problem occurs. Based on this
algorithm if the consumer has participated in the current round
two possible scenarios can happen:
• If the consumer n lost in the previous auction round, fair-
ness factor will be applied with probability of Prob W .
The higher CLn becomes the more Prob W (CLn)
will be. Hence a consumer who is in a more critical
condition to drop the auction has a higher chance of
winning. Fairness factor is hence calculated according to
the following equation:
Fun W (#lossesn, eval funn, CLn) =
(CLn + 1)× ((α1 ×#loosesn) + (α2 × eval funn))
(1)
#loosesn is the total number of looses in the previous
auction rounds and also eval funn is evaluation function
to determine the quality of previous auction rounds’
bids of consumer n based on the historical information
(e.g. the number of requested resources, suggested prices,
etc.) and will be calculated through the equations that
is introduced in [6]. Where α1 and α2 coefficients are
factors to strike a balance between the aforementioned
two terms.
• If the consumer n won in the previous auction round,
fairness factor will be applied with the probability
of Prob L. The smaller CLn becomes the higher
Prob L(CLn) and hence, the smaller chance of winning
for a consumer. For this case, the fairness factor is
calculated according to the following equation:
Fun L(#winsn, eval funn, CLn) =
−1× 1
CLn + 1
× ((β1 ×#wins) + β2
eval funn
)
(2)
where #wins is the total number of wins in the previous
auction rounds and β1 and β2 play similar roles to α1 and α2.
Result: Fairness factor
for consumern ∈ participants in current auction round
do
if consumern failed in previous auction round then
if Random(0, 1) < Prob W (CLn) then
FairnessFactorn=
Fun W (#loosesn, eval funcn, CLn)
end
else
if Random(0, 1) < Prob L(CLn) then
FairnessFactorn=
Fun L(#winsn, eval funcn, CLn)
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Calculation of the fairness factor algorithm
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The proposed model consists of three main phases of 1)
bidding policies, 2)winning determination problem (WDP) and
3) pricing mechanism. In the bidding policies phase, there is
a way each participant should bid according to the predefined
rules. In phase of WDP phase, winners are determined with the
aim of maximizing the total utility considering fairness factor
using integer programming. After determining the winners, in
the pricing phase trade prices that consumers should pay to
providers are calculated.
A. Bidding Policies
In the proposed model N consumers, M providers and L
resource types are considered. Each of the consumers and
the providers request and offer different types of resources
for buying and selling, independently from each other. The
consumer n(1 ≤ n ≤ N) requests the following two-tuple
bid:
• Bid
′
n = (Price
′
n, Quantity
′
n), where Price
′
n =
(P
′
n1 , P
′
n2 , . . . , P
′
nL) is the suggested prices for the re-
quested resources by the consumer n, P
′
nl
is the suggested
price per unit of resource type l (1 ≤ l ≤ L) by the
consumer n, Quantity
′
n = (Q
′
n1 , Q
′
n2 , . . . , Q
′
nL) is the
required resources bundle by the consumer n and Q
′
nl
indicates the required resource type l by the consumer n.
Also The provider m, 1 ≤ m ≤ M offers the following two-
tuple bid:
• Bidm = (Pricem, Quantitym), where Pricem =
(Pm1 , Pm2 . . . , PmL) is the suggested prices for the of-
fered resources by the provider m, Pml indicates the
suggested price per unit of resource type l by the provider
m, Quantityn = (Qm1 , Qm2 , . . . , QmL) is the offered
resources bundle by the provider m and Qml indicates
the offered resource type l by the provider m.
Next, the auctioneer collects the initial bids of the con-
sumers and then according to the stored historical informa-
tion in the repository extends the bids by fairness attribute.
We defined the consumer extended bid as BidExt
′
n =
(Bid
′
n, FairnessFactorn) where FairnessFactorn is the
fairness factor for the consumer n calculated by Algorithm 1.
B. Winning Determination Problem (WDP)
Winner determination problem (WDP) plays an important
role in an auction and its performance will change according
to which algorithm is used [12]. The purpose of WDP is
to determine the participants who have the best bids as the
winners. The best bids are selected based on criteria such
as the suggested price for each unit of the resources. In our
proposed method, we formulate WDP in integer programming
(IP) framework to maximize the total utility of the participants.
Also in order to guarantee fairness in the auction we apply
the fairness factor based on the criteria mentioned previously
in a random fashion. Applying the fairness factor besides
maximization of the utility, decreases the chance of winning
of a participant who has dominated the auction and by con-
trast, increases the winning odds for the weaker participants.
Accordingly, we define the objective function as follows:
Obj = max {Total Utility + Total Satisfaction}.
Each provider and consumer has a utility function which
represents the difference between the suggested price and the
trade price and is calculated according to (3) for the provider
m and the consumer n.
Utilitym = trade price− suggested price
Utilityn = suggested price− trade price
(3)
The Total Utility of participants is the summation of all
consumers and providers utilities and is obtained through the
following formula:
Total Utility = Consumers Utilities+ Providers Utilities =
(
∑
n,l
xnP
′
nl
Q
′
nl
−
∑
n,l,m
ynlmTradePricenlm)+
(
∑
n,l,m
ynlm(TradePricenlm − Pml))
(4)
vn =
∑
l
P ′nlQ
′
nl (5)
In the above equations, TradePricenlm is the transaction
price between the consumer n and provider m per unit of
resource type l. Also vn is the total budget that the consumer
n can pay for all the required resources. Accordingly, we have,
Total Utility =
∑
n
xn.vn −
∑
m,n,l
ynlm.Pml
and the Total Satisfaction of consumers is computed as:
Total Satisfaction =
(∑
n
xnFairnessFactorn
)
where the constraints are tied together according to the fol-
lowing integer programming formulation:
xn ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ 1 . . . N
ynlm ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Qml} ∀m ∈ 1 . . .M,
∀n ∈ 1 . . . N, ∀l ∈ 1 . . . L
xn ≥
∑
l,m
ynlm
 /(∑
l
Q
′
nl
)
∀n ∈ 1 . . . N
xn ≤
∑
l,m
ynlm ∀n ∈ 1 . . . N∑
n
ynlm ≤ Qml ∀l ∈ 1 . . . L,
∀m ∈ 1 . . .M∑
m
ynlm = xn.Q
′
nl ∀n ∈ 1 . . . N,
∀l ∈ 1 . . . L
ynlm
(
P
′
nL − PmL
)
≥ 0 ∀n ∈ 1 . . . N, ∀l ∈ 1 . . . L,
∀m ∈ 1 . . .M
In the above relations, xn = 1 indicates that consumer n has
won the auction round and gets all the resources he requested
in his bid and lost otherwise (xn = 0), ynlm is the number
of resource type l sold by the provider m to consumer n and
vn is the suggested price for all requested resources by the
consumer n.
C. Pricing Mechanism
After determining the winners of the auction, each consumer
must pay an amount to use resources of the related provider.
This amount should be fair for both the customer and the
provider to bring about some level of satisfaction among both
parties. In the calculation of trade price, the average suggested
prices approach is considered for each type of resources. It
is assumed that consumer n received the resources of type l
from provider m and therefore the final payable amount for
this resource is given by:
TradePricenlm =
(P
′
nl + Pml)
2
(6)
Moreover, the total payment that consumer n (provider m)
must pay (receives) is computed as bellow:
TradePricen =
M∑
m=1
L∑
l=1
Total qnlmTradePricenlm (7)
TradePricem =
N∑
n=1
L∑
l=1
Total qnlmTradePricenlm (8)
where in the above equation Total qnlm is the number of
resources of type l that consumer n takes from provider m.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we simulate our proposed model to evaluate
and compare it with a model which do not incorporate the
fairness factor into its model, in terms of utility, the average
percentage of resource utilization, the average percentage of
winnings for consumers, the number of bidder drops, and
the average round that bidder drop occurs. We use the Java
language to implement the model and ILOG CPLEX v12.6
library to solve the corresponding WDP.
A. Experimental setup
We simulate an auction for 100 rounds and we repeated
it for 10 times with different random seeds. We consid-
ered 4 different types of resources, 300 consumers and 5
providers. Each provider offers a random number (according
to a uniform distribution, U(30, 100)) of resource for each
resource category, and each consumer requests from each type
of resource 1-3 times (according to a uniform distribution,
U(1, 3)) in range of [1, 3]. Also the suggested price of each
provider is distributed randomly within the range [50, 200] and
the suggested price for each consumer is selected, randomly
(U [100, 250]), according to the suggested prices from the
previous round. For each consumer, the bidder drop problem
occurs when he loosed 7 consecutive auction rounds in a row.
Table I demonstrates the selected parameters for the described
scenario.
TABLE I: Algorithm parametrization
Parameter name Parameter value
α1 9
α2 7
β1 4
β2 28
ml 6
N 300
M 5
L 4
# rounds 100
# simulation runs 10
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Fig. 2: The number of bidder drops across different runs
B. Experimental Result
Figure 2 and 3 make comparisons between the MDFCDA
and the no fairness models in terms of the number of bidder
drops and the average round number that bidder drop occurs.
As depicted in these figures, the number of drops in MDFCDA
is consistently smaller than the baseline model and the bidder
drop always occurs in the later rounds. Figure 4 depicts
the total utility (i.e. summation of providers and consumers
utilities) in different runs of auction. According to the figure,
in terms of the utilities the baseline model slightly outperforms
the MDFCDA which is a trade-off due to the higher fairness
in the MDFCDA model. Figure 5 and 6 compare the average
percentage of resource utilization and the average percentage
of consumer wins between the two models. As clearly implied
by the figures, the proposed model outperforms the baseline
model. Figure 7 and 8 illustrate cumulative sum of the number
of bidder drops and the average percent of resource utilization,
for a single run respectively. Overall, from the simulation
results we can conclude that our model improves the average
percentage of resource utilization and the average percentage
of consumer wins and also decreases the number of bidder
drop in different auction rounds.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Fair resource allocation has been always a challenging
task in auction systems, yet few papers have addressed this
important criterion in auction systems. Here we made an effort
to integrate the fairness as a factor by leveraging the power of
integer programming and efficient tools to solve the optimum
solutions for this NP-complete problem. In so doing, we
developed a combinatorial double-sided auction model with
fairness factor to maximize the overall profit while at the same
time maintaining some level of fairness. Our results showed
that our proposed model promisingly outperforms a similar
baseline model where the fairness factor is not considered.
The MDFCDA model can efficiently deal with the bidder
drop problem and yield better resource utilization. Moreover,
It results in a higher average number of winners for most cases.
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